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\n\n\n\n- \n \r\n\t\t\t\t\t Indian Submissions in WTO\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\n \n\n\n
- \n \r\n\r\n\t\t\t\t\t Agriculture\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\n \n\n\n
- OPERATION OF THE GREEN BOX\t\t\t\t\t\n \n
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\n\n\tOPERATION OF THE GREEN BOX
\nRESTRICTED\n
\nG/AG/NG/S/18 16 October 2000\n
\nCommittee on Agriculture Special Session
\n(00-4272)\n
\n\n(00-4272)\n
OPERATION OF THE GREEN BOX\n
\nIssues Raised by Members in AIE Papers and Pre-Seattle Submissions
\nA Compilation by the Secretariat
Introduction\n
\n- \n
- At the third Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture on 28-29 September 2000, the Secretariat was requested to prepare a background paper containing a compilation of issues relating to the operation of the Green Box based on relevant AIE papers and pre-Seattle submissions by Members. This paper has been prepared in response to that request. \n
- Part II of this paper indicates the main issues raised by those Members which have made written submissions in the AIE and pre-Seattle context. For a full appreciation of the points made by the respective Member concerned, the original documents should be consulted. It should be noted that the comments listed below reflect the position of the Member concerned. The paper is without prejudice to the views of other Members on any or all of the comments to which it refers. \n
- The Annex to this paper includes a list of the relevant documents submitted by Members to the Analysis and Information Exchange (AIE) process and in the preparations for the Ministerial Conference in Seattle. \n
- The discussions of the issues raised in the AIE process were reported to the Committee on Agriculture by the Chairman. The reports of the Chairman are included in the Secretariat summary reports of the Committee meetings (G/AG/R/11 – R/20 and G/L/322). These reports should also be examined for a better appreciation of the issues raised and the discussion between Members. \n
Table of Contents\n
\nCairns Group (WT/GC/W/156, 23.3.99) *
\nCanada (public statement 18.8.99) *
\nCuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe (WT/GC/W/374, 7.10.99) *
\nBrazil (23-24.11.98) *
\nEuropean Communities (WT/GC/W/273, 27.7.99) *
\nIndia (23-24.11.98) *
\nIndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (WT/GC/W/331, 22.9.99) *
\nJamaica (WT/GC/W/370, 5.10.99) *
\nJapan (24.3.99 – for distribution) *
\nJapan (WT/GC/W/220, 28.6.99) *
\nKorea (WT/GC/W/170, 12.4.99) *
\nNorway (2.2.99) *
\nTurkey (12.4.99) *
\nUnited States (WT/GC/W/290, 27.7.99) *
\nAustralia (AIE/4, 16.5.97) *
\nAustralia (AIE/27, 5.6.98) *
\nAustralia (AIE/35, 4.9.98) *
\nBulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (AIE/45, 18.11.98) *
\nEl Salvador, Cuba, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe (AIE/70, 2.9.99) *
\nCanada (AIE/23, 2.6.1998) *
\nMauritius (AIE/51, 10.3.99) *
\nNorway (AIE/22, 2.6.98) *
\nNorway (AIE/68, 19.9.99) *
\nUnited States (AIE/19, 4.3.98) *
\nUnited States (AIE/38, 15.9.98) *
\nUnited States (AIE/64, 22.6.99) *
\nAnnex 1 *\n
\nISSUES RAISED BY MEMBERS IN THE PROCESS OF ANALYSIS AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE
\nAND THE PREPARATORY PROCESS FOR THE THIRD MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE\n
\n\nAND THE PREPARATORY PROCESS FOR THE THIRD MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE\n
\n\n\n
\n
\n| Country | \nComment | \n
|---|---|
| Cairns Group (WT/GC/W/156, 23.3.99) | \nThe 1999 negotiations must result in major reductions in domestic support for all agricultural products. All trade distorting domestic subsidies must be eliminated with only non-distorting forms of support permitted. Close attention will be paid to compensation for the shift away from price support and the Cairns Group will work to ensure that income aids or other domestic support measures are targeted, transparent and fully de-coupled so that they do not distort production and trade. | \n
| Canada (public statement 18.8.99) | \nCanada will seek: an overall limit on the amount of domestic support of all types (green, blue and amber); a view of the criteria of the green category to ensure that green support does not distort production and trade, and permanent international recognition that such support should not be countervailable. | \n
| Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe (WT/GC/W/374, 7.10.99) | \nGreen Box policies must be re-examined. The definition of “minimally trade distorting” must be clarified. Various supports, for example, direct decoupled payments and export credits and guarantees which have an effect of increasing production output must be removed from the Green Box category and be placed in the AMS and export subsidy categories respectively. Green Box subsidies should be limited to a certain percentage of production costs and this percentage should be higher for developing countries. | \n
| Brazil (23-24.11.98) | \nBrazil deems necessary to revise the so-called Green Box and thus properly address many of the legitimate concerns linked to agriculture. It must be stressed that Green Box provisions can provide the necessary tools to deal with non-trade concerns. | \n
| European Communities (WT/GC/W/273, 27.7.99) | \nIt is essential to ensure that progress on trade issues does not damage the ability of those employed in agriculture to supply public goods, in particular as regards the environment (including combating desertification) and the sustained vitality of rural areas. Direct aid measures with no or minimal trade impact have an important role to play in this context. | \n
| India (23-24.11.98) | \nThe only way that developing countries’ non-trade concerns can be met, is by providing a certain degree of flexibility to these countries by appropriately modifying the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, particularly as far as domestic support and Green Box measures are concerned. For instance it would be important to recognize that the 10 per cent de minimis level presently provided under the AMS, may not be sufficient for developing countries to give the kind of support needed to alleviate poverty and sustain rural employment. Moreover, specific guidelines would need to be formulated on how to compensate for excessive rates of inflation and depreciation of currency. Similarly, some aspects of the Green Box measures may also need to be reviewed in order to provide a certain degree of flexibility to developing countries. For instance, the restrictions on public holdings for food security purposes and domestic aid do not appear to be entirely realistic since at times it would be impractical to insist on hard and fast criterion for eligibility for distributing subsidized food grains, particularly in view of the geographical spread of the vulnerable sections of society. | \n
| Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (WT/GC/W/331, 22.9.99) | \nThe criteria for the “Green Box” category of support measures, or Annex 2 of the Agreement must be reviewed to ensure that they meet the basic requirement that they have no or at least minimal trade distorting effects on production and trade, and that they adequately address the trade, financial and development needs of developing countries. | \n
| Jamaica (WT/GC/W/370, 5.10.99) | \nWeak disciplines in the area of domestic supports and in particular, with the operation of the “Green Box”, suggests the need for strict monitoring to determine whether or not programmes satisfy the eligibility criterion of being production- and trade-neutral. Developing countries have had serious concerns that increases in certain categories of domestic support programmes by some WTO Members may be leading to increased production and increase competition on import/export markets. Jamaica proposes that Members agree on stricter disciplines being placed on the use of “Green Box” supports to ensure that they retain their intended “non-production distorting” and “non-trade distorting” feature. WTO Members should afford developing countries adequate flexibility in the use of domestic support programmes pursuant to particular national development objectives such as: poverty alleviation, marketing and transportation and compliance with quality as well as sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. | \n
| Japan (24.3.99 – for distribution) | \nThe establishment of a “Green Box” category in the framework of a reduction commitment in domestic support has the effect that domestic support policies in each country will lead to policies without trade distortion. Narrowing down the scope of the “Green Box” will give a bad signal to the agricultural reform process in each country. | \n
| Japan (WT/GC/W/220, 28.6.99) | \nSince it is impossible to drastically review this classification [of “Green”, “Blue” and “Amber”] and to fully eliminate the trade distortion effect of the “Green Box”, it is appropriate to maintain the present framework and to review the requirements and scope for “green” policies based on the experiences achieved in implementing the past agreements, with a view to facilitating a smooth conversion towards a market-oriented policy. | \n
| Korea (23-24.11.98) | \nSome of the requirements for Green Box measures contained in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture should be improved so as to reflect the multi-functionality of agriculture and non-trade concerns (NTCs) more adequately. | \n
| Korea (WT/GC/W/170, 12.4.99) | \nCriteria for Green Box measures call for a more flexible and gradual approach. | \n
| Norway (2.2.99) | \nGreen Box policies to a large extent may be the solution in high-potential areas of production. However, in low potential areas, such as Norway, it may be necessary to apply a combination of measures. | \n
| Turkey (12.4.99) | \nWith respect to Green Box policies, improvements in the text of Annex 2 of the Agreement of Agriculture may be considered from the perspective of developing countries. | \n
| United States (WT/GC/W/290, 27.7.99) | \nThe United States proposes that the agriculture negotiations result in substantial reductions in trade-distorting support and stronger rules that ensure all production-related support is subject to discipline, while preserving criteria-based “Green-Box” policies that can provide support to agriculture in a manner that minimizes distortions to trade. Criteria contained in Annex 2 (“Green Box”) have allowed Members to provide appropriate and legitimate support to farmers in a manner that minimizes distortions to trade while recognizing the important role of agriculture in Member economies. The results of these negotiations should ensure that the “Green Box” exemption continues to support the primary objectives of minimizing the link between support and production through the use of appropriately specified policies. | \n
| Australia (AIE/4, 16.5.97) | \nExperience to date on implementation of new or modified domestic support policies suggests that, at the government administration level, there is a difficulty in developing or determining agricultural support programmes which meet the WTO Agricultural Agreement’s disciplines on the basis of criteria contained in the Agreement. Preliminary experience to date on the basis of notifications would suggest that there may be some confusion over domestic support policies captured by Article 6.5 of the Agriculture Agreement and those under Annex 2, paragraph 10. | \n
| Australia (AIE/27, 5.6.98) | \nIn reviewing the framework of disciplines on domestic support and setting the basis for future reform, a threshold question to consider is whether the measures identified under the Green Box are in fact non- or minimally distorting. There has been little analysis of how current Green Box measures actually affect the level of production and trade, either in principle or in practice. If Green Box measures are to remain a component of the framework, then it will be important to ensure that allowable measures are targeted, transparent and do not distort production and trade, otherwise the use by Members of Green Box measures will undermine the benefits from reform of other domestic subsidies. Developing clearer and tighter definitions of acceptable measures will be essential in ensuring that Green Box subsidies achieve their goals without trade distorting impacts. Since the Agreement on Agriculture came into force, Members have adopted a variety of measures which they have claimed meet the definition included in Annex 2 but, as set out in Australia’s previous AIE paper on Green Box support measures (AIE/4), there is uncertainty about the validity of some of these claims. The difficulties in developing programmes that are consistent with Annex 2 arise partly because different domestic support measures defined in the Annex have different effects on the level of production and trade. In developing any improved definitions for acceptable measures, it would be important to take into account their practical application and the need for Members to be able to readily verify that measures are consistent with Green Box criteria. Given the importance of decoupled support measures as a component of any future Green Box, further work on the identification of fully decoupled mechanisms that are truly minimally trade distorting will also be essential. In addition to further analytical work, a discussion of Members’ experiences in this area would be very useful. The US paper on the 1996 FAIR Act (AIE/19) provides an analysis of that Member’s experience in the process of de-coupling government support payments from the level of agricultural production and trade. Payments such as the seven-year production flexibility contracts are one example of a support measure designed to allow farmers to produce for the market and not according to non-market related signals. While acknowledging that the US payments are relatively decoupled from production and prices, it remains an open question whether they are or are not market distorting because of their investment and risk reducing effects. AIE/19 also illustrates the effect that de-coupling support can have on building domestic farmers’ support for trade liberalization. | \n
| Australia (AIE/35, 4.9.98) | \nThe policy specific criteria and conditions listed in Annex 2 do not provide sufficient guidance to ensure that allowable measures meet the fundamental requirement that they involve no or minimal distortions to production and trade. Australia believes that it is essential that a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of all permitted Green Box measures is undertaken to ensure their consistency with this fundamental requirement. With respect to decoupled support, the use of a “defined and fixed” base period, as well as additional requirements that allowable payments cannot be related to production, domestic or international prices, or factors of production in any year after the base period and that payments cannot be contingent on production, are important mechanisms for weakening the linkages between the income support and production. However, the opportunity to base or relate payments to production or productive resources in the base period remains and may still result in a degree of coupling to production levels. At a minimum, adding a requirement that the base period be “historical” would be useful to help further reduce this linkage. It may also be useful to develop criteria that completely remove the linkages between payments and production levels, and which encourage greater use of generally available income support instruments such as those provided through the social security and tax systems. Developing eligibility criteria which are based on or related to household income from all sources, both on and off the farm, would also help to weaken the linkages between income payments and production. | \n
| Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (AIE/45, 18.11.98) | \nThe agreement does not contain any provision which would adequately address the specific needs of Members which are in the process of transformation to a fully-fledged market system or consolidating the results of such a deep-going economic process. The only – narrowly worded – provision in the present agreement which tries to accommodate such concerns is paragraph 11 of Annex 2 by virtue of which structural adjustment assistance through investment aids also as part of the reprivatization of agricultural land qualifies as a Green Box measure. Although at first glance a relatively wide range of Blue and Green Box measures seem to be available also for transition and post-transition economies, in reality the specific circumstances accompanying the process of economic transformation render them often useless: -on the one hand due to the serious decline or in certain cases the collapse of agricultural production introducing production-limiting programmes (Blue Box) or encouraging producer or resource retirement (Green Box) is clearly not an option since it would just lead to the further aggravation of the difficult situation experienced in many agricultural production areas; -on the other hand the use of some of the Green Box measures such as decoupled income support, income insurance and income safety net programmes presuppose reasonable and comparable base periods and adequate administration or private mechanisms in place which is not the case in most of these countries. | \n
| El Salvador, Cuba, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe (AIE/70, 2.9.99) | \nAnnex 2 (Green Box) provisions are most popularly seen as providing member countries with flexibilities to deal with their special needs in the area of agricultural trade. However, evidence of the recent years shows that these provisions are probably better suited to the problems and situations of developed countries. FAO’s studies have shown that Green Box measures do not come cheap and as such, are not appropriate for developing country governments. Furthermore, such policies are beyond the reach of developing countries which are constrained by structural adjustment programmes and obligations. Such reforms call for less government interventions, especially in terms of budgetary outlays (Food Policy Vol 21 No. 4/5 1996; 442). Most of the agricultural support policies pursued by developing countries presently fall under the “general services category”. Policies falling under the category of “direct payment to producers” are much rarer in developing countries compared to developed countries. This suggests that the decoupled income support policies, due to their high administrative cost required to ensure appropriate targeting, makes such policies relatively expensive and difficult for developing countries to implement. “It is clear that by and large the list of Green Box policies was drawn up with the developed countries in mind, as every single Green Box policy is much more common in developed countries than in developing countries (Konandreas and Greenfield, Food Policy Vol. 21 No. 4/5, 1996)”. For most developing countries that use the Green Box, outlays are less than 5 per cent of agricultural GDP. All in all, it is clear that these ‘market plus’ flexibilities are not particularly helpful to developing countries especially because many of the programmes require large capital outlays. Measures more suitable for developing countries would not exclude policies requiring capital outlays, but would also include other measures such as greater flexibility on import controls. Given this situation, there is therefore an urgent need to provide developing countries with market plus flexibilities that are suitable to their use. | \n
| Canada (AIE/23, 2.6.1998) | \nDo the basic and policy-specific criteria and conditions set out in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture adequately capture domestic support measures that meet the fundamental requirement that they have “no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production”? (The issue arises as to whether the present Annex 2 successfully ensures that the a priori expectations for the group of domestic support measures it is meant to encompass are being met.) Essentially there are two issues: whether there are measures that meet the fundamental requirements of paragraph 1 but do not fully conform to policy-specific criteria and conditions established in paragraphs 2 to 13; and on the other hand, whether there are measures that would meet the policy-specific criteria of one of paragraphs 2 to 13 but that may nonetheless have production or trade-distorting effects. Will the fact of “de-coupling” support from current production decisions always guarantee that a payment will have no or minimal effects on production? Canada’s experience with risk management and income safety nets suggests that it may be possible to design a farm income risk management tool that shares market risk between producers and government, is jointly funded by producers and government, is not tied to price or production fluctuations for specific commodities, and does not in fact distort production or trade. However, it can be difficult for such a programme to meet the detailed criteria of paragraph 7 in Annex 2, on government participation in income safety net programmes, which were conceived essentially for government-financed income guarantee programmes. To the extent that domestic support measures that fully conform to the provisions of Annex 2 are considered to be consistent with the achievement of the long-term objective as set out in Article 20 of the Agreement, the AIE process may consider whether a continuation of the provisions of Article 13(a) beyond 2003 would contribute to the continuation of the reform process. It is virtually impossible for domestic support measures to be completely decoupled from production and trade. Agricultural production, consumption, trade, market prices and/or other non-agricultural elements cannot be absolutely dissociated from one another, and will virtually always be affected in some way by the presence of domestic support measures. Another element for consideration is the desirability of continuing, beyond the present implementation period, the exemption from the reduction commitments under paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture for support measures that fully conform to Annex 2 provisions. Is the exemption from reduction commitments for Annex 2 measures consistent with the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection? To the extent that Annex 2 measures are considered consistent with the long-term objective set out in Article 20, does Article 13 (a) of the Agreement on Agriculture have an ongoing role in the continuation of the reform process? | \n
| Mauritius (AIE/51, 10.3.99) | \nDeveloping countries have limited recourse to the provisions of Annex 2. The measures spelt out in paragraphs 2(a), 7 and 11 of Annex 2 are fulfilled to a certain extent in Mauritius. However, Mauritian producers assume the costs involved themselves. Therefore, the expenditure incurred is de facto outside the purview of Annex 2. | \n
| Norway (AIE/22, 2.6.98) | \nThe multi-functionality of Norwegian agriculture is ensured through a combination of economic, legislative and administrative measures, as well as through training and extension. In 1997, total transfers associated with agricultural policies amounted to US$3 billion. Net budgetary outlays amounted to US$1.7 billion and, thus, accounted for 57 per cent of the transfers, while transfers from consumers through border protection accounted for 43 per cent. Blue Box measures (primarily acreage and livestock support) represent approximately 60 per cent of budgetary outlays, while Green Box measures amount to around one third. AMS policies, basically, account for the remaining budgetary support. | \n
| Norway (AIE/68, 19.9.99) | \nThe paper presents four farm cases in Norway comparing the present situation with a scenario consisting of a “world-market-only” scenario in which all production-related policy measures (i.e. Blue Box and AMS, including border protection) have been replaced by Green Box support. There are two major reasons why such a scenario does not seem to be possible in Norway, from the point of view of safeguarding NTCs. First, the data presented clearly indicate that the “world-market-only” scenario is not likely to provide sufficient financial incentives to farmers to continue production in the long run. With world market prices only, production revenues would only cover 30-41 per cent of total production costs, which is clearly not sufficient. Second, extensive detailed targeting of measures directly to a number of NTC-related criteria that would be necessary to safeguard NTCs under a “world-market-only” scenario, would most likely not be practically feasible and would in any case probably involve unacceptably high administration and control costs. Second, whereas, as an alternative to production-related support, it has been suggested to target Green Box measures directly to a number of NTC-related criteria in order to safeguard NTCs, extensive detailed targeting is probably not practically feasible. More importantly, such targeting will most likely involve very high administration and control costs, especially in areas where the agricultural sector consists of a large number of small-sized farmers. Maximum targeting of policies is of course desired. However, there is certainly a trade-off between precision, on the one hand, and administration and control costs, on the other hand. Therefore, while a certain degree of targeting should be pursued in national policy design, too extensive and detailed targeting does not seem to be feasible. Further research on this issue should be undertaken. | \n
| United States, (AIE/19, 4.3.98) | \nReforms culminated in the 1990 Farm Bill that made the US direct payments for major bulk commodities contingent upon certain production-limiting criteria. The revised payment programme served as one of the models for Article 6.5 payments in the Agreement on Agriculture. While reform of price support programmes went forward, the United States Department of Agriculture increased its focus on policies not directly related to production as a means to meet the needs of the farm sector. These included a range of “Green Box” policies to protect the environment, promote conservation and rural development, encourage efficient agricultural production and processing industries, foment research, and protect human, animal, and plant life and health. The 1996 Fair Act. The FAIR Act of 1996 made significant changes in long-standing US agricultural policies. The terms of the FAIR Act will guide US agricultural programmes in crop years 1996-2002. Its most dramatic provisions were de-coupling direct payments from actual production and prices and elimination of set aside requirements. Additionally, the FAIR Act includes important reforms affecting all commodities and many other programmes, ranging from environmental programmes to food stamps. The most radical reform of the FAIR Act was the elimination of the deficiency payment programme for wheat, feed grains, cotton and rice. Instead of basing payments on the difference between market prices and a target price on a portion of their production, farmers who had official programme crop acreage bases receive fixed direct payments, called production flexibility contract payments, which decline after 1998 through the year 2002. Direct payments levels are determined by farmers’ historical programme acreage and yields and are not based on current plantings. Instead, producers are not even required to plant a crop to receive payments, making the payments fully decoupled. Farmers receiving payments will make cropping decisions based on their estimation of profit potential on the basis of market conditions. Certain compliance conditions continue in order to be eligible for direct payments. Producers must, for example, comply with certain conservation or environmental requirements and limitations on producing fruits and vegetables or using land for non-agricultural commercial purposes. By increasing producers’ reliance on the market, making government payments largely independent of farm prices and production decisions, and freeing producers to follow their particular competitive advantage, the FAIR Act has reduced reliance on export subsidies and moved domestic support to the “Green Box”. It also makes US producers more dependent upon world markets, thereby increasing the stake of US producers in full implementation of WTO commitments and further multilateral reform. | \n
| United States (AIE/38, 15.9.98) | \nThe Annex 2 definitions have stood up remarkably well to the test of three years of implementation. The concern we had in the negotiations was that they would be either defined too narrowly, and not allow countries to engage in legitimate basic rural support activities; or that they would be defined too broadly, and would allow countries to disguise production subsidies under Annex 2 programme title. Annex 2 has not been defined too broadly – most measures notified under Annex 2 appear to have limited trade-distorting effects. More importantly, the Green Box has provided Members with the ability to provide support to farmers while meeting the WTO’s long-term goal of reducing trade distortion. While Annex 2 policy criteria may require some “fine-tuning,”we do not see the need for major surgery. Decoupled payments are an important policy option, and, based on research in the OECD and other organizations, payments delinked from production and prices have no effect on trade. Furthermore, analysis by USDA’s Economic Research Service has shown that providing decoupled income support, rather than direct payments tied to supply control mechanisms, enhances farmers’ ability to respond to market signals, resulting in more economically efficient production. The US production flexibility contract programme does not involve transfers from consumers as it is publicly-funded, and since payments are not linked to prices, the type of output, or factors of production, and farmers are not required to produce to receive the payment, this programme does not have the effect of providing price support. | \n
| United States (AIE/64, 22.6.99) | \nThe challenge for all WTO Members is to find a way to strengthen the farm “safety-net” and sustain viable rural communities in a way that allows markets to work and trade channels to stay open, so that all Members can meet the non-trade objectives of their citizens. The Annex 2 “Green Box” provisions are the best way to achieve this balance, and entirely consistent with the long-term objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system. For example, the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 2, which describe the appropriate conditions for making direct payments, give ample latitude to design specialized, targeted measures to meet many non-trade policy objectives. The current “Green Box” provisions (Annex 2) of the Agreement on Agriculture contain sufficient and appropriate scope to accommodate a Member’s decision to adopt domestic policies to address non-trade concerns. We realize that budgetary constraints may hinder some Members from using the “Green Box” to the fullest extent possible. We would note, however, that there are significant, hidden costs in utilizing measures that may not require budgetary outlays but that distort production and trade. For example, using price support mechanisms to increase output also raises the prices consumers pay for food, thus reducing their food security, and can have negative effects on the environment, through greater input use and soil degradation. These outcomes run counter to the intended effect. Furthermore, if such policies are trade-distorting, the loss incurred by other Members is not compensated by the realization of domestic objectives, whatever their nature. | \n
Annex 1\n
\nDocuments Submitted by Members\n
\nAIE Process\n
\nPreparatory Process for the Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO\n
\nWT/GC/W/156 Cairns Group Objectives for the Mandated Agriculture Negotiations – Communication from Australia
\nWT/GC/W/170 Agriculture – Communication from Korea
\nWT/GC/W/220 Negotiations on Agriculture – Communication from Japan
\nWT/GC/W/273 EC Approach on Agriculture – Communication from the European Communities
\nWT/GC/W/290 Negotiations on Agriculture – Objectives for the Agriculture Negotiations: Domestic Support – Communication from the United States
\nWT/GC/W/331 Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in World Agricultural Trade and the Mandated Negotiations – Communication from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand
\nWT/GC/W/370 Agreement on Agriculture – Communication from Jamaica
\nWT/GC/W/374 Agriculture – Proposal under paragraphs 9(a)(i) and 9(a)(ii) of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration – Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe
\nAIE/4 “Green Box” Domestic Support – by Australia
\nAIE/19 Domestic Support Policy Reform (the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996) – by the United States
\nAIE/22 Non-Trade Concerns in a Multifunctional Agriculture – Implications for Agricultural Policy and the Multilateral Trading System – by Norway
\nAIE/23 Domestic Support Measures Exempt from Reduction Commitments – by Canada
\nAIE/27 Reforming Domestic Support for Agriculture – by Australia
\nAIE/35 Decoupling Domestic Support – by Australia
\nAIE/38 Domestic Support – Response to AIE/23 and AIE/27 – by the United States
\nAIE/51 Multifunctional Role of Agriculture in Small Island Developing States – by Mauritius
\nAIE/64 The “Multifunctional” Character of Agriculture, Food Security and Other Non-Trade Concerns – by the United States
\nAIE/68 Appropriate Policy Measure Combinations to Safeguard Non-Trade Concerns of a Multifunctional Agriculture – by Norway
\nAIE/70 Agreement on Agriculture: Special and Differential Treatment – Non-Paper 2 by El Salvador, Cuba, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe
\nBrazil Statement made in the General Council on 23-24 November 1998
\nIndia Statement made in the General Council on 23-24 November 1998
\nJapan Statement made in the General Council on 24 March 1999
\nNorway Statement made in the General Council on 2 February 1999
\nTurkey Statement made in the General Council on 12 April 1999
\nCanada Statement made in the General Council on 18 August 1999
\n\n